Creditor Proposal
This proposal is put forward as a possible way to proceed after the recent hack. The objective is to compensate all pBTC holders in their role as BTC creditors to the pNetwork.
Why is it important to fully compensate the creditors?
The creditors trusted the pNetwork to keep the collateral backing their pBTC tokens safe, but unfortunately it was stolen while in the custody of pNetwork, and it is the pNetwork and its stake holders that must bear the cost of that mistake. In the absence of any credible compensation plan, the creditors will simply have to seek legal recourse, and possibly force the pNetwork DAO, and the companies behind or associated with it, into legal bankruptcy, and thereby recover their original capital through the forced liquidation of assets. To prevent this from happening, creditors must be credibly reassured by the stakeholders that their interest in recovering capital is in the continued existence of the pNetwork rather than bankruptcy proceedings.
Terms
For the creditors to accept any proposal going forward, the following terms must be met:
- the debt must be repaid fully
- the debt must be repaid in the original currency it was issued in (BTC)
The only variable to be negotiated should be the time horizon, not the amount itself, nor the unit denominating the debt (BTC).
If those terms are met, then the creditors can agree to restructure the debt to prevent bankruptcy.
Debt Restructuring
The creditors will agree to not seek redemption of their pBTC through court proceedings if:
- 80% of all revenue must be redirected towards repurchasing the uncollateralized pBTC
- the uncollateralized pBTC must be burned by the DAO thereby reducing its overall amount
- this must continue until all uncollateralized pBTC is burnt
Once all uncollateralized pBTC is burnt, no creditor can have any claims on the pNetwork, as they will have all been made whole.
NFTs
If the above terms are met, the team behind the network can have wide latitude in how they choose to generate income - whether through the issuance of NFTs or any other measures they have control over. It is in the interest of the stakeholders to repay the debt as soon as possible, so that the revenue from those measures can then continue to accrue to them. The bondholders seek no upside, just to limit their downside.
pBTCv1 vs pBTCv2
Because the broken peg prevents the proper functioning of the BSC bridge, and thereby deprives the network of an additional sources of revenue, a new token can be issued (pBTCv2), and the original renamed to (pBTCv1). pBTCv2 will be pegged 1:1 from the start, and will be used on the BTC-on-BSC bridge. The creation of the pBTCv1 token shall in no way, shape, or form mean that pNetwork defaults on its obligation to restore the peg of the pBTCv2 token. The objective is simply not to deprive the network of the supplemental revenue to be generated from the BSC bridge.
Possible Scenarios
Two possible scenarios - one optimistic, one pessimistic.
The optimistic scenario is that the measures put forward by the team regarding the NFT or a sudden upsurge in the usage of pNetwork will lead to explosive growth in income, and the debt will be repaid much sooner than expected.
The pessimistic scenario is that the pNetwork will default on its obligation to the creditors because of lack of sufficient revenue, and the creditors will force pNetwork into bankruptcy, thereby pushing the price of PNT to 0.
Rogue Creditor
Not all creditors may agree to this proposal, and a rogue creditor may seek legal recourse despite the pNetwork meeting the terms outlined above. To prevent this from happening, the biggest creditors can band together, and commit to not apply downward pressure on the pBTCv1 price, and perhaps even inject BTC to restore the peg immediately. That would give any rogue creditor an exit option and render their legal case null and void. Additionally, such measures will limit the downside to smaller pBTCv1 holders, who will not have to needlessly suffer because of this hack.